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 Abstract: There is increasing interest in using neuro-stimulation devices to achieve an 
ergogenic effect in elite athletes. Although the World Anti-Doping Authority (WADA) 
does not currently prohibit neuro-stimulation techniques, a number of researchers have 
called on WADA to consider its position on this issue. Focusing on trans-cranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) as a case study of an imminent so-called ‘neuro-doping’ 
intervention, we argue that the emerging evidence suggests that tDCS may meet 
WADA’s own criteria (pertaining to safety, performance-enhancing effect, and 
incompatibility with the ‘spirit of sport’) for a method’s inclusion on its list of 
prohibited substances and methods. We begin by surveying WADA’s general 
approach to doping, and highlight important limitations to the current evidence base 
regarding the performance-enhancing effect of pharmacological doping substances. We 
then review the current evidence base for the safety and efficacy of tDCS, and argue 
that despite significant shortcomings, it may be sufficient for WADA to consider 
prohibiting tDCS, in light of the comparable flaws in the evidence base for 
pharmacological doping substances. In the second half of the paper, we argue that the 
question of whether WADA ought to ban tDCS turns significantly on the question of 
whether it is compatible with the ‘spirit of sport’ criterion. We critique some of the 
previously published positions on this, and advocate our own sport-specific and 
application-specific approach. Despite these arguments, we finally conclude by 





 Doping is a well-documented problem in elite sport, with a considerable 
number of athletes employing a range of prohibited substances and methods to gain an 
edge in competition. However, in recent years, a new form of performance-
enhancement has begun to emerge, so-called “neuro-doping”, in which athletes attempt 
to enhance performance by electronically stimulating the brain. As research in the area 
progresses, there is some emerging evidence to suggest that neuro-stimulation may have 
the potential to improve sporting performance by virtue of its acute effects on motor 
skills and cognition, and its longer tem effects on skill acquisition (Angius et al., 2017; 
Holgado et al., 2019a; Machado et al., 2019). Indeed, athletes are already openly using 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) in training (Ingle, 2015; Reardon, 2016), 
and researchers are also reporting ergogenic effects of trans-cranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) (Goodall et al., 2014). More speculatively, as research into non-invasive forms of 
Deep Brain Stimulation continues (Grossman et al., 2017), the longer term future may 





bring far more precise forms of neuro-stimulation to bear on the enhancement of 
athletic performance.  
 
 Neuro-doping techniques add new dimensions to old questions about the ethics 
of doping in sport. Moreover, unlike many conventional forms of doping, neuro-doping 
techniques are currently not prohibited by the World Anti-Doping Authority (WADA). 
In this context, a number of researchers in the field have called on WADA to consider 
whether neuro-doping techniques ought to be added to its list of prohibited substances 
and techniques. Yet, there are a number of diverging opinions on the correct approach 
for WADA to take in this regard, with some researchers suggesting that current neuro-
doping techniques should be prohibited by WADA (Park, 2017), whilst others suggest 
more lenient approaches to potential regulation, including permitting its use in all sport 
(Lavazza, 2019), or permitting its use in training, but not in competition (Davis, 2013; 
Imperatori et al., 2018). 
 
 At the outset, it is important to be clear that when considering whether any 
particular substance or method ought to be prohibited by WADA, the question can be 
asked in two senses. First, we might be interested in the question in an ideal sense; is 
the use of the substance or method compatible with the values that we want to uphold 
in sport? Depending on our answer, we might also be interested in the prohibition 
question in a non-ideal sense: that is, we might ask whether WADA can realistically and 
ethically prevent the use of a problematic doping technique in the real world. For the 
majority of this paper, we shall be interested in the question of whether neuro-doping 
should be prohibited in the ideal sense. We prioritise this question on the basis that if 
there is no rationale for prohibiting neuro-doping in the ideal sense, then we do not 
need to be concerned with the practicalities of prohibiting it. However, we shall turn to 
the non-idealized question in our concluding remarks. 
 
 With respect to the ideal question, we shall argue that the existing evidence-base 
provides a rationale that may be sufficient for WADA to prohibit some uses of neuro-
doping, both in training and competition. We nuance this general position by 
suggesting that the variable effects that neuro-doping techniques may have call for both 
an application-specific and sport-specific approach to thinking about its permissibility in 
elite sport. To place the issue of neuro-doping into its proper context, we shall begin by 
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surveying the approach that WADA takes to other forms of doping, and highlight 
important limitations to the current evidence-base for the performance-enhancing effect 
of currently prohibited substances. In section 2, we shall focus our discussion on tDCS 
as a case study of a neuro-doping intervention, and provide an overview of the current 
evidence base regarding its safety and ergogenic effects. We suggest that although there 
are significant shortcomings in the current evidence regarding the latter, the evidence 
base may yet be sufficient for WADA to consider prohibiting tDCS, in light of the 
comparable flaws in the evidence-base for other prohibited substances. As such, in the 
final section, we turn to the question of whether tDCS is compatible with the ‘spirit of 
sport’ criterion that plays a crucial role in WADA’s approach to doping. In doing so, 
we shall highlight some flaws with some of the previously published positions on neuro-
doping, and advocate our own sport-specific approach. 
 
 
1. WADA, Doping Methods and The Epistemology of Doping 
 
I The WADA Code & Prohibited Substance List 
 
 Doping carries harsh sanctions, and there are significant socio-cultural costs of 
being viewed as a ‘dirty’ athlete. Athletes who violate anti-doping rules are typically 
disqualified from the event during which the rule violation occurred, and they are often 
rendered ineligible from future competitions for a significant amount of time (World 
Anti-Doping Agency, 2019a). Furthermore, WADA operates a strict liability approach 
that allows for retrospective punishment, so athletes may be found guilty of a rule 
violation during and after competition, despite the absence of fault, negligence, or lack 
of knowledge.  
 
 Although ‘the presence or administration of a prohibited substance or method’ 
is not the only anti-doping rule violation (Kornbeck, 2013), it is the most relevant for 
our purposes here. Of course, what constitutes this kind of violation depends upon 
what substances and methods are prohibited. These are documented in a list that is 
annually updated by WADA (World Anti-Doping Agency, 2019b). A separate 
document, the WADA code, includes criteria that are used to determine whether a 
substance or technique should be placed on the prohibited list (World Anti-Doping 
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Agency, 2019a). The express purpose of the Code (World Anti-Doping Agency, 
2019a) is to bring “consistency to anti-doping rules, regulations and policies worldwide”. 
 
 Section 4.3 of the current Code states that a substance or method shall be 
considered for inclusion on the Prohibited List if WADA, in its sole discretion, 




4.3.1.1 Medical or other scientific evidence, pharmacological effect or experience that 
the substance or method, alone or in combination with other substances or 
methods, has the potential to enhance or enhances sport performance. 
 
4.3.1.2 Medical or other scientific evidence, pharmacological effect or experience that 
the Use of the substance or method represents an actual or potential health 
risk to the Athlete;  
 
4.3.1.3 WADA’s determination that the Use of the substance or method violates the 




In the interests of brevity, we shall refer to these as the ‘enhancement’ criterion, the 
‘safety’ criterion, and the ‘spirit of sport’ criterion respectively. 
 
 By virtue of the so-called ‘2/3 rule’, none of the above is a necessary condition 
of inclusion on the prohibited list. Strikingly, this means that it is possible for something 
to be placed on the list even if it does not satisfy the enhancement criterion. For 
instance, cannabinoids are included on the prohibited list (World Anti-Doping Agency, 
2019b), despite evidence suggesting that they actually diminish performance, raising 
considerable debate (McNamee, 2012; Waddington and Møller, 2014). This has led 
some to call for WADA to modify the 2/3 rule, so that the enhancement criterion 
becomes a necessary condition of inclusion on the prohibited list (Kornbeck, 2013; 
McNamee, 2012). Of course, if one accepts this line of argument, then this would 
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would render evidence regarding the performance-enhancing effect of any given 
intervention of the utmost importance in ascertaining whether or not it should be 
prohibited by WADA. 
 
 The enhancement and safety criteria outlined above both relate to ostensibly 
empirical matters. On the other hand, the spirit of sport criterion is an ethical criterion 
pertaining to the value and meaning of sport (Loland and McNamee, 2019). How 
should this be assessed? We shall later explain why this criterion is particularly 
contentious, but for now, we can make do with outlining WADA’s own understanding 






The spirit of sport is the celebration of the human spirit, body and mind, and is 
reflected in values we find in and through sport, including: 
 
• Dedication and commitment 
• Respect for rules and laws 
• Respect for self and other participants 
• Courage 
• Community and solidarity 
• Ethics, fair play and honesty 
• Health 
• Excellence in performance 
• Character and education 
• Fun and joy 
• Teamwork (World Anti-Doping Agency, 2019a) 
 
 
1 For a proposed revision, see (Loland and McNamee, 2019) 
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 There are a few noteworthy points here. The first is that this is most charitably 
interpreted as a characterisation of the spirit of sport (rather than a definition), one that 
aims to offer only “an incomplete, unsystematic and unstructured account of key values 
in ethical sport”, rather than a set of necessary and sufficient conditions (McNamee, 
2012). As McNamee (2012) points out, on such a reading, some of the criticisms that 
have been raised against the criterion lose some of their force.2 That said, even on this 
interpretation, many of the values that constitute the characterisation are strikingly 
vague. McNamee has argued that this is not problematic, since we often have to accept 
vagueness in commonplace concepts, and that the vagueness of the spirit of sport 
criterion is appropriate given its role (McNamee, 2012). Yet, it is difficult to see how the 
vagueness of the criterion is not problematic by WADA’s own lights, for the simple 
reason that the express purpose of the Code is to bring consistency to anti-doping rules. 
Vagueness in concepts is surely the enemy of the consistent application of moral 
principles. 
 
 As such, it will help to elucidate the spirit of sport criterion by briefly outlining 
some concrete examples of the substances and techniques that WADA does (and does 
not) include on its Prohibited List. Doing so will also highlight the problems we face in 
attempting to overcome the vagueness problem, and to achieving a consistent 
interpretation of the criterion. 
 
 
II What WADA Does (and Does Not) Prohibit 
 
 
 There are three broad categories of substances and methods prohibited by 
WADA:  
 
(1) Those that are prohibited both in competition and in training;  
 
(2) Those that are prohibited only in competition;  
 
2
 For such criticisms, see (Savulescu et al., 2004; Gleaves, 2011; Kornbeck, 2013; Mazanov, 2016; 
Kayser and Tolleneer, 2017). Some of these authors use these criticisms of the spirit of sport criterion 
as a basis to develop highly revisionist approaches to anti-doping rules. Here though, we shall only be 




 (3) Those that are only prohibited only in certain sports.  
 
 Substances and techniques in the first category are placed there on the basis of 
their potential to enhance both acute performance and future performance. One 
commonly invoked example is erythropoietin (EPO), which was implicated in the 
Lance Armstrong doping scandal. EPO is a natural hormone that stimulates red blood 
cell production and decreases plasma volume. It is thought to enhance athletic 
performance primarily by increasing the recipient’s oxygen transport capacity, thereby 
delaying fatigue (Lundby and Olsen, 2011). Other substances in this first category 
include, inter alia, anabolic agents, Beta 2 Agonists, and hormone and metabolic 
modulators.
3
 Methods in this category include, inter alia, manipulation of blood and 
blood components, and gene and cell doping (World Anti-Doping Agency, 2019b). 
 
 In the second category, a smaller class of substances are banned only in 
completion, which (by WADA’s terms)
4
 means they are only prohibited in the twelve 
hours leading up to competition (World Anti-Doping Agency, 2019a). Substances in 
this category include most stimulants,
5
 narcotics, glucocorticoids, and cannabinoids 
(World Anti-Doping Agency, 2019b). These substances are prohibited during 
competition on the basis of their acute effects on performance, but they are nonetheless 
permitted in training.   
 
 Finally, beta-blockers are given special treatment and are included alone in the 
third category, as they are only banned in specific precision sports. This is largely based 
on evidence suggesting that they can significantly reduce tremors: One study showed 
that elite shooters taking beta-blockers experienced an average of 13.4% of possible 
improvement over placebo (Kruse et al., 1986). In the majority of precision sports, beta 
blockers are only prohibited in-competition (for instance in, inter alia, darts, golf, and 
 
3
 Diuretics and masking agents are also prohibited both in and out of competition, due to non-ideal 
considerations about enforcing the prohibition of other enhancing interventions. 
4
 The WADA code provisions allow for an International Federation or ruling body of particular events 
to offer alternative definitions of ‘in-competition’ (World Anti-Doping Agency, 2019a). 
5
 Clonidine and Imidazole are excluded from this prohibition. So too are 7 stimulants that are included 
in the 2019 Monitoring Program Bupropion, caffeine, nicotine, phenylephrine, phenylpropanolamine, 




skiing); however, they are banned both in and out of completion in the case of shooting 
and archery (World Anti-Doping Agency, 2019b). 
  
 Although this exhausts the categories of substances and methods that are 
currently prohibited by WADA, the organisation also runs a programme to monitor 
the use of substances that “are not on the prohibited list, but which WADA wishes to 
monitor in order to detect patterns of misuse in sport”(World Anti-Doping Agency, 
2019a). One notable inclusion on this list is caffeine. Although there is strong evidence 
to suggest that caffeine does have an acute performance-enhancing effect (Doherty and 
Smith, 2004), it was taken off the prohibited list in 2003, partly due to difficulties in 
distinguishing performance-enhancing doses from normal daily consumption of coffee 
and soft drinks (Payne, 2017; ABC News 2003). Caffeine, it appears, is thus an 
example of a performance-enhancing agent that is not prohibited, partly on the basis of 
non-ideal considerations regarding the enforceability of such a ban. 
  
 There are also a number of other performance-enhancing methods and training 
techniques that are not prohibited or even monitored by WADA, but which serve as 
useful comparison cases for any theory-driven approach to moral questions about 
doping and the spirit of sport.  For instance, the use of hypoxic air tents is permitted 
(albeit somewhat controversially), despite the claim that they arguably have a broadly 
comparable physiological effect to the prohibited substance EPO (Savulescu et al., 
2004). Finally, we may also note that WADA permits various kinds of expensive 
equipment (such as hypoxic air tents) that increase sporting performance in a manner 
that perpetuates unfairness in sport, not to mention the athlete’s own natural genetic 
constitution, which can clearly put them at an advantage over other competitors 
(Savulescu et al., 2004).  
 These examples of so called ‘grey zones’ (Loland and McNamee, 2019) in the 
doping debate raise serious questions for how we should understand the spirit of sport 
criterion. Although the express aim of the WADA code is to bring consistency to anti-
doping rules, it is difficult to identify a principled basis upon which we might 
consistently apply the spirit of sport criterion in a manner that accommodates all of 
these examples. We shall return to this point when we consider how WADA might 
accommodate neuro-doping methods. To conclude this part of the discussion though, 
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we want to highlight an epistemological issue surrounding the general anti-doping 
project. 
 
iii) The Epistemology of Doping 
 
 We mentioned above that some in the anti-doping literature endorse a move 
away from the 2/3 rule towards one where satisfying the enhancement criterion 
becomes a necessary condition of inclusion on the prohibited list. In this context, the 
current evidence base for the performance-enhancing effect of substances on WADA’s 
prohibited list is surprisingly poor. In a recent review counting only findings from (i) 
double-blind, randomized controlled trials that were (ii) performed in trained subjects, 
and (iii) measured relevant sporting performance outcomes as evidence for 
performance-enhancing effects, Heuberger and Cohen (2019) concluded that only five 
out of the 23 substance classes prohibited by WADA show evidence of having the 
ability to enhance actual sports performance. For instance, although EPO is often cited 
as a paradigmatic example of a performance-enhancing drug, these authors argue that 
there is a lack of high quality evidence for its performance-enhancing effects in elite 
athletes (Heuberger and Cohen, 2019; Heuberger et al., 2013).  
 
 The authors suggest that the problem with the existing evidence base is that 
many published studies are attended by significant methodological short-comings, when 
they are considered as evidence for including something on the prohibited list 
(Heuberger and Cohen, 2019). First, many studies use surrogate markers (such as 
VO2max) instead of direct performance measures (such as a time trial) as their outcome 
measure, even though the former may have low predictive value for actual athletic 
performance in elite athletes (Heuberger and Cohen, 2019). Second, notwithstanding 
concerns about the use of such surrogate markers per se, some studies use tests of these 
indirect markers that do not resemble normal exercise; for example the use of maximal 
exercise test to generate VO2max marker has been criticized on this score. (Noakes, 
2008). Third, many studies do not adequately reflect the target population (namely elite 
and professional athletes), as they investigate the effects of substances in subjects with 
far lower levels of training – however, results regarding exercise interventions in one 




 Of course, absence of evidence does not amount to evidence of absence; it may 
be that all of the substances on the prohibited list enhance performance, even if that has 
not yet been adequately empirically established. There are also a number of ethical 
obstacles to carrying out high quality trials of potentially harmful performance-
enhancing drugs (McNamee et al., 2006). Perhaps more importantly though, the fact 
that WADA lacks evidence to establish that a substance or method has a performance-
enhancing effect need not preclude them from prohibiting it. In some cases, this might 
be because there are health risks associated with the intervention in conjunction with 
concerns about the spirit of sport (as seems to be the case with cannabinoids). More 
strikingly though, given the wording of the enhancement criterion, and in particular its 
appeal to the mere ‘potential to enhance’, WADA is under no obligation to use 
scientific evidence in supporting its decision if “sufficient determination can be found 
within WADA’s List Committee and Executive Committee” (Kornbeck, 2013). 
 
 The safety and efficacy of a substance is an empirical matter; but the standard of 
evidence that WADA requires, and the thresholds it imposes in order to justify 
prohibiting substances, are ethical judgments. Indeed, there may be ethical reasons to 
require a low threshold of evidence in this context. We might invoke a precautionary 
principle to justify banning a substance that we have reason to suppose has the potential 
to pose a significant risk of harm even if we have only limited evidence of such an effect. 
Similarly, if a number of athletic teams are using a substance because they believe it is 
effective, that itself may provide a ‘wisdom of the crowd’ evidentiary basis for 
precautiously assuming that the substance does have a performance-enhancing effect, 
even if we lack robust evidence to confirm the effect. Nonetheless, WADA has been 
criticized for its lack of transparency about the way it makes these sort of 
determinations (Loland and McNamee, 2019; McNamee, 2012). It is therefore difficult 
to assess how it approaches these judgments, and the broader moral and 
epistemological questions about how they define and empirically establish performance 
enhancement in sport (Simon and Dettweiler, 2019).  
  
 In the interests of brevity, we must set these important questions aside, and we 
shall remain silent on the justifiability of the specific evidential thresholds that WADA 
employs. However, we outline the above considerations as they are an important lens 
through which we should consider the question of how we should regulate neuro-
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doping techniques. The key point for our purposes here is that the absence of scientific 
evidence for the performance-enhancing efficacy (and/or harmfulness) of an 
intervention is not sufficient to mean that the intervention will not fail WADA’s safety 
and enhancement criteria. With this in mind, we now turn our focus to tDCS. 
 
II tDCS as a Performance-Enhancing Intervention 
 
 
 Researchers are currently investigating a number of different neuro-doping 
techniques. However, to limit the scope of our discussion, in the remainder of this 
paper, we shall focus on tDCS as a case study of a neuro-doping technique. We choose 
this specific intervention on the basis that (i) some competitors are already employing it 
as a training aid and (ii) there are already a considerable number of studies investigating 
its safety and ergogenic effect. Although we limit our discussion to this specific 
intervention, the way in which WADA chooses to regulate tDCS is likely to have 
considerable implications for how other, perhaps more powerful neuro-doping 
techniques are regulated in the future. 
 
 tDCS is a non-invasive form of neuro-stimulation delivered via two electrodes 
placed on the scalp (incorporated into a small, portable and easily removable head-
mounted device). When a weak (1-2mA) constant current is applied for short periods 
of time, it passes painlessly through the brain and alters spontaneous neural activity 
(Stagg and Nitsche, 2011). The nature of the effects are dependent on the placement of 
the electrodes, as well as the magnitude and polarity of stimulation: anodal stimulation 
stimulates spontaneous neuronal activity, whilst cathodal stimulation inhibits it (Davis, 
2013; Nitsche et al., 2008; Stagg and Nitsche, 2011). tDCS has already been 
investigated as an experimental treatment modality for neurological and psychological 
disorders including, inter alia, Parkinson’s Disease (Benninger et al., 2010), 
neuropathic pain (Ngernyam et al., 2013), and depression (Bennabi and Haffen, 2018). 
However, there have been mixed results in these applications, and there is still debate 
about the extent of tDCS’ therapeutic efficacy, possible mechanisms of any apparent 
therapeutic effects, ideal stimulation sites, and whether tDCS affects local stimulation 
sites or whole brain networks (To et al., 2018). 
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 As we shall detail below, both cathodal and anodal tDCS are being investigated 
for their potential performance-enhancing effects. In any case, the effects of stimulation 
are greatest in the period of time immediately after stimulation, and decline over a 
period of between 20-60mins depending on the parameters of stimulation (Davis, 
2013). Notably, it is currently not possible to detect whether an individual has 
undergone tDCS, at least not without a high risk of false positive judgements (Davis, 
2013). This will of course have considerable implications for the non-ideal question of 





 Whilst further data is clearly necessary, existing data suggest that tDCS is a 
reasonably safe intervention. Like any medical procedure, tDCS is attended by some 
low risks of moderate adverse events (such as headaches and dizziness) (Bikson et al., 
2016), but when it is used within established safety parameters, these risks may be 
acceptably low, given the potential benefits of the technology (Antal et al., 2017; Bikson 
et al., 2016; Davis, 2013). A review of the safety of tDCS found that conventional uses 
of the intervention in human trials has not yet produced any serious adverse events 
(Bikson et al., 2016). 
 
 Accordingly, as Davis, (2013) and Imperatori et al., (2018) have suggested, data 
regarding the safety profile of tDCS gives some grounds for doubting that tDCS would 
fall foul of WADA’s safety criteria for inclusion on the prohibited list.
6
 Nonetheless, the 
claim that tDCS is a reasonably safe intervention must be attended by the following 
caveats, particularly when we consider it in the context of athletic performance. The 
first is that we lack evidence about the long-term effects of chronic neuro-stimulation 
using tDCS. Second, neurophysiological studies in healthy individuals have established 
a short-term interaction between tDCS and pharmacological agents (McLaren et al., 
2018). Although there is no evidence of these interactions leading to serious adverse 
effects (Bikson et al., 2016), we should be mindful of the fact that we know little about 
the potential interactions between tDCS and other doping substances that athletes may 
 
6
 For a dissenting view, see (Park, 2017) 
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be taking. Finally, dysfunctional tDCS devices unsurprisingly pose risks that do not 
attend clinical tDCS protocols (Maslen et al., 2014). This is a particularly important 
point in the present context, given the fact that individuals can (and do) make their own 
tDCS devices (Wexler, 2017). There is a possibility that the considerable pressure on 
elite athletes may tempt them to try and achieve a greater enhancing effect by using 
tDCS outside of established safety parameters. 
 
 Accordingly, the question of whether tDCS violates the safety criterion of the 
WADA code depends a great deal on the threshold of ‘potential to do harm’ that 
WADA employs to justify prohibition. Whilst it is plausible that tDCS could be 
deemed to pose a potential risk of harm that would be above a low precautionary 
threshold, it is unclear that employing such a low threshold is compatible with the fact 
that many sports put performers at significant degrees of risk (Loland and McNamee, 
2019). For this reason, we shall simply assume that tDCS may plausibly pose a level of 
risk to athletes that would be acceptable to WADA. On this assumption, the question 
of whether WADA should prohibit tDCS turns on (i) its potential to enhance 
performance and (ii) whether it is compatible with the spirit of sport. In the remainder 
of this section we shall consider the former, before turning to the second point in more 
detail in the second half of this paper. 
 
ii) Enhancing Performance 
 
 
 Since tDCS can be used to modulate activity in different areas of the brain, it 
might plausibly have a range of effects that might be relevant for sporting performance. 
However, whilst some analyses of the intervention have suggested that the current 
evidence-base indicates that tDCS “seems to have a positive effect on exercise capacity” 
(Angius et al., 2017; Imperatori et al., 2018), this position is not universally endorsed. 
 
 In a paper discussing the early promise of tDCS as a potential means of neuro-
doping, Nick Davis (2013) identified two domains in which tDCS might lead to 
performance enhancement in sport: (i) immediate acute gains in motor skill and (ii) 
longer term effects in skill acquisition. Since then, a number of detailed overviews and 
meta-analyses of the evolving evidence-base for the ergogenic effects of tDCS have been 
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published (Angius et al., 2017; Edwards et al., 2017; Holgado et al., 2019a; Imperatori 
et al., 2018; Lattari et al., 2018; Machado et al., 2019). Rather than repeat that work and 
provide an exhaustive record of the current evidence-base, here we shall give only a 
flavour of some of the most prominent themes in this evolving literature. We shall 
conclude our discussion with some critical comments on the current evidence-base, 
drawing on our earlier discussion of the evidence-base for substances that are currently 
banned by WADA.  
  
 Published studies to this point have primarily focused on the acute ergogenic 
effects of tDCS, and so we shall primarily concern ourselves with these effects in this 
overview. Prior to doing so, it should be noted that in light of evidence suggesting that 
tDCS can enhance skill acquisition and reproduction outside of the sporting context 
(Reis et al., 2009; Vines et al., 2008), researchers have also started to investigate the 
effect of tDCS on the acquisition of skills required in sporting performance. Most 
notably, Zhu et al. (2015) provided cathodal stimulation over the left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex whilst practicing a golf-putting task in a ‘training phase’. When the 
subjects returned for the ‘test phase’ of the experiment on another day, those in the 
active stimulation group performed significantly better on the golf-putting task than 
those in the sham group. The authors suggested that stimulation served to temporarily 
suppress verbal working memory activity, fostering implicit motor learning (Zhu et al., 
2015). Crucially, though, the subjects had no previous golf experience, raising 
significant concerns about the implications of these results, particularly for elite athletic 
performance. 
  
 Turning to published studies on the acute effects of tDCS on motor skills, 
following Angius et al. (2017), such studies can broadly be categorised into two groups: 
those that focus on the effects of tDCS on isolated muscle groups in isometric single 
joint exercises, and those that focus on whole body dynamic exercises. One influential 
study in the former category by Cogiamanian et al. (2007) assessed maximum voluntary 
contraction (MVC) in 24 healthy subjects’ left elbow flexors and a fatiguing isometric 
contraction (35% of MVC), before and immediately after stimulation delivered over the 
cortical motor areas. Notably, their data suggest that tDCS may have led to relative 
improvement in muscular endurance in submaximal isometric contraction, but did not 
affect the MVC of the subjects. Further, although no evaluated electromyographic 
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variables changed after tDCS, a significant increase in corticospinal excitability was 
observed. The authors took this finding to suggest the hypothesis that stimulation over 
the primary motor cortex serves to increase the output of this neural area during 
exercise, and thus modulate supraspinal fatigue. 
  
 However, further studies employing similar protocols have had only limited 
success in reproducing these findings. Both Kan et al. (2013) and Muthalib et al. (2013) 
employed a similar protocol but did not observe increased muscular endurance 
following tDCS. In contrast, Abdelmoula et al., (2016) did observe increases in 
muscular time to fatigue but (in contrast to Cogiamanian et al [2007]) this occurred in 
the absence of increased corticospinal excitability. More recent studies have also begun 
to investigate the effects of tDCS in both dynamic and isokinetic exercise, again with 
mixed results (Hendy and Kidgell, 2013; Lattari et al., 2018; Montenegro et al., 2015; 
Sales et al., 2016). 
  
 In the present context, an important limitation of these studies investigating 
isolated muscle groups is that there is not a straightforward relationship between 
performance on tasks performed in the studies (particularly in non-athletes) and the 
conditions of athletic performance (Edwards et al., 2017) . In light of this, other studies 
investigating the acute effects of tDCS on exercise have moved their focus to its effects 
on whole body dynamic exercises. One of the most notable studies in this regard by 
Okano et al., (2015) showed that peak power output during a maximal incremental 
cycling task increased by ∼4% following anodal tDCS over the temporal cortex. This 
improved peak power output was also accompanied by reduced rate of perceived 
exertion (RPE) and heart rate during submaximal exercise intensities, compared to a 
sham condition.  
  
 Once again though, other comparable studies have not been able to wholly 
reproduce these findings. Some have failed to reproduce any significant ergogenic effect 
on whole-body exercise. Similarly applying anodal tDCS to the temporal cortex (but 
prior to 20-km cycling time trial rather than a maximal incremental cycling task), 
Barwood et al. (2016) did not find any improvements in power output or cycling 
performance. Furthermore, Baldari et al. (2018) did not find any improvement in 
physiological responses (including heart rate, pulmonary ventilation, and VO2max), 
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perceived exertion, affective valence, or exercise performance in recreational runners 
on a maximal incremental running test following anodal tDCS to the primary motor 
cortex. In contrast Vitor-Costa et al., (2015) found an improvement in submaximal 
exercise tolerance on a cycling task following anodal tDCS to the primary motor cortex, 
but this was not accompanied by changes to evaluated physiological or perceptual 
parameters of the sort observed in Okano’s study, including the subject’s heart rate and 
RPE.  
  
 Finally, whilst studies investigating the acute ergogenic effect of tDCS have 
primarily focused on strength and endurance, a recently published study has 
investigated its effects on acute performance in a precision sport. Applying anodal 
stimulation over the cerebellar and Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) regions, 
Kamali et al., (2019) found that stimulation improved mean shooting score in 
experienced pistol shooters by 2.3%. Notably, this improvement was accompanied by 
a significantly decreased number of errors in a dynamic tremor task performed after 
the shooting task. The authors suggest that this supports a “relationship between the 
potentially decreased physiological tremor and enhancement in shooting 
performance” (Kamali et al., 2019). Although this is an isolated study, it is a notable 
comparator to Kruse et al's, (1986) study (cited in the previous section) investigating 
the effect of Beta-Blockers on pistol shooting performance.  
  
 As even this brief overview makes clear, the evidence regarding the acute effects 
of tDCS on exercise performance is highly variable. Although there is some data to 
support the claim that tDCS may have a positive effect on exercise capacity, it is notable 
that two recent systematic reviews and meta-analyses have raised significant doubts 
about this (Holgado et al., 2019a; Machado et al., 2019). Indeed, Holgado et al. (2019a) 
conclude that “current evidence does not provide strong support to the conclusion that 
tDCS is an effective means to improve exercise performance”. A number of 
explanations for the variable results in the literature have been offered, including the 
fact that many studies have (i) used different stimulation parameters and montages, (ii) 
been statistically underpowered, (iii) measured performance on different exercise tasks, 
and (iv) in subjects with different levels of training (Lefaucheur, 2019; Machado et al., 




 Indeed, a study by Montenegro et al., (2011) suggests that tDCS may evince 
favourable physiological effects amongst highly fit subjects but not in non-trained 
individuals. In this study, tDCS applied to the left temporal lobe at rest significantly 
increased heart rate variability amongst highly trained subjects, “enhancing the 
parasympathetic and decreasing the sympathetic modulation of heart rate” 
(Montenegro et al., 2011). However, this favourable effect was not observed in non-
trained individuals. This study provides reason for suggesting that Holgado et al.’s 
fourth explanation above is particularly significant in the context of considering 
WADA’s approach to tDCS. 
 
 Although these limitations to the current evidence-base suggest a need to 
downplay the hype surrounding the ergogenic effect of tDCS (Holgado et al., 2019b, 
2019a; Machado et al., 2019), these limitations are very similar to the those attending 
studies investigating the performance enhancing effect of pharmacological substances 
banned by WADA. As we wrote above, absence of evidence in this regard is not 
sufficient to preclude tDCS from failing WADA’s enhancement criterion. Accordingly, 
whilst it may be true that the beneficial ergogenic effects of tDCS are “largely 
controversial and probably more relevant in statistical rather than clinical terms” 
(Lefaucheur, 2019), that is not to say that the current evidence-base is not sufficient for 
tDCS to be of interest to WADA. 
  
 However, the variability of the current evidence base raises a different issue for 
the question of whether tDCS should qualify as a prohibited method on WADA’s 
terms. Even if we assume that tDCS does have a performance-enhancing effect, the 
conflicting results in the literature make it difficult to establish the mechanism via which 
any performance-enhancing effect is evinced (Angius et al., 2017). Whilst this is not a 
problem from the perspective of the enhancement criterion, it may be from the 
perspective of the spirit of sport criterion. Even pre-theoretically, it seems plausible to 
suppose that the mechanism via which a substance or method evinces a performance-
enhancing effect will have a considerable bearing on whether or not it is compatible 
with the spirit of sport. 
  
 This is not to say that there are no similarities across studies that can ground 
plausible hypotheses about potential mechanisms. Above, we described Cogiamanian et 
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al's (2007) hypothesis that anodal stimulation over the primary motor cortex modulates 
supraspinal fatigue. Whilst this hypothesis has received further empirical support in 
those studies where performance enhancement following stimulation is accompanied 
by a decrease in RPE (Vitor-Costa et al., 2015), this relationship has not always been 
reproduced (Abdelmoula et al., 2016; Lampropoulou and Nowicky, 2013). 
Furthermore, studies finding reductions in exercise-induced pain in the absence of any 
improvement in performance amongst elite athletes raises the possibility of a ceiling 
effect on the potential of tDCS to improve motor performance in this group, even if it 
can nonetheless enhance affective and cognitive properties (Flood et al., 2017; 
Lefaucheur, 2019; Valenzuela et al., 2019). There is also data to suggest that such 
effects of stimulation on cognition and mood could offer a potential competitive 
advantage (Borducchi et al., 2016). 
 In view of the above discussion, the question of whether WADA ought to 
prohibit it in light of it’s 2/3 rule will turn to a large extent on whether it is understood 
to violate the spirit of sport. We shall now consider this criterion. 
 
III tDCS and the Spirit of Sport 
 
 The main challenge raised by the ‘spirit of sport’ criterion is whether it is 
possible to identify a principled basis that can explain WADA’s judgments about what 
is (and is not) included on the prohibited list, one that is also consistent with the values 
outlined in the spirit of sport criterion. The difficulties of meeting this challenge have 
led some theorists to suggest that we should abandon the criterion, and adopt revisionist 
approaches to the prohibition of performance-enhancing interventions (Hon, 2017; 
Mazanov, 2016; Savulescu et al., 2004). Whatever the merits of this approach, we shall 
not discuss it here.
7
 Instead, we shall assume that WADA may justifiably prohibit some 
performance-enhancing interventions, and shall respond to some prominent attempts 




 Similarly, we shall not engage further with Lavazza's (2019) compensation strategy for tDCS in sport, 
which is premised on the thought that inequalities raised by tDCS could be compensated for by 
allowing athletes to use other drugs prohibited by WADA. 
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 To date, Imperatori et al (2018) have provided the most detailed analysis of the 
implications of the spirit of sport criterion for tDCS. Whilst acknowledging the 
considerable theoretical contribution of this article, we shall begin by critically engaging 
with their analysis and highlighting some points of departure.  
 Imperatori et al. distil WADA’s spirit of sport criterion into three key features. 
They claim a performance enhancement is compatible with their distilled conception if 
it meets the following three criteria:  
 
(i) It is sufficiently safe to use;  
(ii) Hard work is required to achieve an increase in performance;8  
(iii) It is available to most athletes.  
 
They argue that tDCS, at least in training, is compatible with all of these criteria, and 
implicitly endorse the view that WADA should regulate tDCS in the same way it 
regulates stimulants: its use should be permitted in training but not competition. We 
agree with Imperatori et al. that tDCS may be sufficiently safe to use, so we shall focus 
our analysis on (ii) and (iii), starting with the latter. 
 
i) Inequality and Fairness 
 
 Criterion (iii) relates to conditions of social inequality, and the authors note that 
it is grounded by WADA’s own concern with the values of ‘respect for self and others’ 
and ‘community and solidarity’ in their vision of the spirit of sport (as outlined in box 1) 
(Imperatori et al., 2018). The thought underlying this criterion is that performance-
enhancing interventions should be accessible to athlete’s competing in the same sport. 
If a performance-enhancing method or substance is too expensive for most athletes to 
access, then its use runs contrary to the spirit of sport. However, these authors (and 
others) note that tDCS is compatible with this criterion because of its comparatively low 





 Imperatori et al. (2018) take this criterion to be implied by WADA’s appeal to ‘character and 
education’ and ‘dedication and commitment’ in their Spirit of Sport characterization. 
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 We agree with Imperatori et al. that tDCS is reasonably accessible as an 
ergogenic aid from a financial perspective. However, there is scope for questioning 
whether financial inequality is the only consideration relevant to considerations of 
fairness in this context.  
 
 In many ways, sport is a celebration of certain inequalities Savulescu et al., 
(2004). Imperatori et al., (2018) also specifically advert to the fact that athletic 
performance is heavily influenced by factors that are largely outside of the athlete’s 
control, including financial investment and the individual’s athletic traits. They argue 
that a point in favour of tDCS is that it may be used to somewhat level the playing field 
between amateur athletes and elite athletes by ‘steepening the learning curve’ for 




 These authors all argue that we should try to limit the influence of certain 
inequalities in sport. But how do we distinguish those inequalities that are compatible 
with fair competition, and those whose influence that we ought to diminish? Although 
they do not directly consider this question, the fact that Imperatori et al (2018) note that 
athletes lack control over certain key factors that impact performance suggests that they 
may take control to be a morally relevant factor here. If so, they may endorse the view 
that we should seek to diminish sources of inequality that lie outside of the individual’s 
control, a position recently defended in more detail by Loland, (2018).  
 
 We shall engage with the position in further detail below, as it is crucially linked 
to Imperatori et al.’s hard work condition. At this point though, we may note that even 
assuming this understanding of the normative significance of inequality in sport (and we 
shall raise some doubts about it below), a problem with invoking it in defence of tDCS 
is that this intervention might introduce forms of inequality that athletes cannot control, 
even though it may reduce the influence of others. As Lavazza (2019) points out, data 
from studies investigating the effect of tDCS on cognition suggests that the effects of 
neuro-stimulation are highly variable between subjects, with some individuals failing to 
experience any enhancement effect from stimulation. If, as the current evidence seems 
 
9
 Whilst we have doubts about the extent to which tDCS could level the playing field in this way, let us 
put that empirical point to one side. 
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to suggest, this variability is attributable to individual differences in neuroanatomy 
(broadly construed) and genetic characteristics (rather than electrode placement and 
stimulation parameters alone) (Lavazza, 2019), it is plausible that further investigation 
may show a similar inter-individual variability in the ergogenic effect of tDCS.  
 
 If this is the case, then tDCS could plausibly be said to provide an unequal 
advantage to those athletes who are responders – yet, since the individual athlete can 
exert little control over whether she is a responder, it seems that this is just the sort of 
inequality that we should be trying to reduce by Imperatori et al.’s own lights.  
 
 This is not intended to be a knock-down argument against the claim that tDCS 
is compatible with fairness in sport. For instance, one might hold that the variable 
effects of tDCS introduce inequalities that can be compensated in other ways (Lavazza, 
2019). Alternatively, one might claim that the inter-individual variable effects of tDCS 
are not normatively significant, even though the influence of this sort of inequality lies 
outside of the athlete’s sphere of control. Indeed, as we shall go on to discuss, recent 
discussions of the spirit of sport criterion may offer a theoretical basis for this 
argumentative strategy. The two salient points here though are that (i) performance-
enhancing strategies may be inaccessible for some athletes for non-financial reasons and 
(ii) appeals to control may not be sufficient to explain why these forms of inaccessibility 
are not normatively significant from the perspective of fairness. To go deeper into this 
latter point, we can turn to considerations raised by Imperatori et al.’s criterion of hard 
work. For the sake of argument, we shall now set these concerns about fairness per se 
to one side, and assume that the performance enhancing effects of tDCS are accessible 
to all athletes. 
 
 According to these authors, hard work is defined as “Training the physical skill 
that is tested in competition, which contributes to the ‘development of the whole 
human” (Imperatori et al., 2018). In order to test whether the use of a substance or 
method is compatible with hard work so defined, they suggest that we have to ask 
whether its use enables those who are sedentary to gain a significant, sustained, and 
cumulative performance enhancement. The thought here seems to be that if a 
substance or method does provide such an advantage to sedentary individuals, then it is 
not compatible with hard work; such evidence would suggest that individuals using the 
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substance gain a long-term advantage in the absence of training. Instead, the advantage 
would reflect long-term changes in the individual’s physiology (Imperatori et al., 2018). 
 
 By way of illustration, the authors suggest that EPO would fail this test, but that 
tDCS would pass it. The authors point out that a study by Sieljacks et al., (2016) 
suggests that a 10-week programme of EPO administration to sedentary individuals led 
to significant relative increases in VO2max compared to sham control groups, even when 
controlling for the effects of training. Accordingly, (Imperatori et al., 2018) suggest that 
this study indicates that “. . . EPO administration can clearly increase performance 
without the need to train, at least in non-athletes”. Furthermore, they also note that a 
similar effect has been observed in trained cyclists (Heuberger et al., 2013).
10
 In 
contrast, they suggest that “training is crucial to making significant changes in 




 Whilst this is generally true, Imperatori et al.’s argument here moves too 
quickly. It is true that the putative long-term enhancing effect of tDCS on skill 
acquisition and retention would require the athlete to train the skill in question. 
However, as we discussed above, there is some evidence to suggest that tDCS may also 
have acute physiological effects that may be relevant to athletic performance. Crucially, 
studies in which these acute effects have been observed have not incorporated a training 
period into their design (Okano et al., 2015; Vitor-Costa et al., 2015). Moreover, even if 
these effect sizes are comparatively small, seemingly trivial improvements may be 
sufficient to have an important influence on elite sporting outcomes (Lefaucheur, 2019; 
Machado et al., 2019).
12
 It is thus unclear how these acute effects would be compatible 
with Imperatori et al.’s hard work criterion. Indeed, Imperatori et al. themselves seem 
to implicitly acknowledge this point (despite their remarks quoted above), since they 
conclude their analysis by arguing that tDCS should be permitted in training only, and 
not in competition (Imperatori et al., 2018). They later clarify that their position is 
intended to be implemented in all sports (Imperatori et al., 2018). 
 
10
 For data suggesting that steroids can similarly have a performance-enhancing effect without the 
need for training see (Bhasin et al., 1996) 
11
 Sampedro and Triviño, (2017) similarly emphasize this point. 
12
 For this reason, we disagree with  Sampedro and Pérez Triviño's (2017) suggestion that neuro-




 We are sympathetic to the general contours of Imperatori’s conclusion here. If 
the positive data in favour of the ergogenic effects of tDCS is correct, then tDCS could 
plausibly have acute effects on sporting performance that would be comparable in 
performance-enhancing effect (if not in mechanism) to other banned substances and 
methods. Moreover, depending on the mechanism via which such effects are evinced, it 
might plausibly do so in a manner that would undermine the contribution of ‘hard 
work’ to performance. Finally, we also agree with them to the extent that the use of 
tDCS in training may not always be problematic. However, we also disagree with some 
points of their analysis and their adoption of a one-size fits all approach to regulating 
tDCS in sport.  
 
 To see why, we need to explain some problems with Imperatori et al.’s analysis 
of the role of hard work in the spirit of sport. First, in some ways, their interpretation of 
the criterion is too broad; it would lend support to prohibiting a number of methods 
that are currently permitted. Consider first their emphasis on ‘the physical’ in 
delineating the nature of hard work. One problem with this is that there are a number 
of ways in which individuals can legitimately increase performance without training a 
physical skill. Indeed, the whole enterprise of sports psychology is founded on this 
notion. The mere fact that interventions in sports psychology do not involve training a 
physical skill does not mean that they are thereby incompatible with hard work, or that 
they are thereby contrary to the spirit of sport. This is particularly notable in the present 
context, in view of the aforementioned data suggesting that tDCS may have beneficial 
effects on elements of mood and cognition that are evinced in the absence of training a 
physical skill, but which may nonetheless have an impact on athletic performance.  
 
 It is also difficult to see how the use of hypoxic air tents could satisfy the hard 
work criterion, despite the fact that WADA permits their use. Imperatori et al. attempt 
to circumvent this particular criticism by claiming that the hard work criterion does not 
apply to practices that are essential to survival (such as breathing) or artificial means of 
controlling or optimising these essential practices, because this could conflict with their 
first criterion of safety (Imperatori et al., 2018). However, this is unconvincing; as 
WADA themselves concluded after investigating the matter, hypoxic air tents do not 
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pose an unreasonable safety risk if used within established parameters and under 
medical supervision (Wilber, 2007; Levine, 2006).  
 
 Whilst the above considerations suggest that Imperatori’s et al.’s conception of 
the hard work criterion is overly broad, this does not directly jeopardise their 
conclusion that tDCS is compatible with the spirit of sport. Rather, assuming the 
authors do not want to endorse a revisionist stance to the use of sports psychology and 
hypoxic air tents, it suggests that further elements need to be built into their conception 
of ‘hard work’ in order to explain why these interventions should be permitted 
alongside tDCS, whilst others (EPO for example) should still be prohibited. However, 
the second set of concerns we shall now raise does put pressure on the conclusion that 
tDCS should be permitted in training, since we shall now suggest that the hard work 
criterion is also too narrow. Contrary to Imperatori et al.’s analysis, even in conjunction 
with considerations of safety and accessibility, the hard work criterion may not capture 
all of the interventions that might plausibly be deemed to be contrary to the spirit of 
sport. 
 
 To begin, we may note a problem with Imperatori et al.’s test for whether a 
substance or method obviates the need for hard work. Recall that their test for this is to 
ask whether that substance or method enables sedentary individuals to gain a significant 
sustained, cumulative performance enhancement. Whilst this approach might serve to 
isolate the contribution that an enhancing intervention is making to performance in 
these individuals, the test is nonetheless problematic if its conclusions are generalised to 
justify prohibiting elite athletes from using an intervention like tDCS. As we emphasised 
above, there are a number of reasons why results in studies of exercise outcome 
measures in sedentary individuals will not transfer to elite athletes. Indeed, as we 
described above, Montenegro et al.'s (2011) data suggesting that tDCS improved heart 
rate variability in athletes but not in non-athletes, should give us caution in this regard. 
This is only one study in the specific context of the ergogenic effects of tDCS, but it 
suggests that we should be careful of using Imperatori’s test concerning results in 
sedentary individuals to ascertain when a performance-enhancing substance is reducing 
the need for hard-work in elite athletes.  The test may not be capturing what is morally 




 But a perhaps more striking feature of Imperatori at al’s appeal to the hard 
work criterion is that it is unclear why they (or by proxy WADA) think that hard work 
should matter. The authors suggest that hard work has occurred if ‘training is required’ 
to evince performance enhancement. But this alone is not a sufficient answer to the 
question at hand – training can make more or less of a contribution to achieving a 
better performance in future competition, and it might matter in very different ways. 
Indeed, a substance or method could radically amplify the effect that training has on 
future performance. For instance, whilst steroids can have acute effects in the absence 
of training, data suggest that they have far greater ergogenic effects when they are used 
in combination with training (Bhasin et al., 1996). In a sense then, training is required 
to get the most powerful ergogenic effects of steroids – but it is not clear that this should 
mean that steroid use in combination with training is compatible with the hard work 
criterion, but their use in the absence of training is not. 
 
 As such, even assuming that some of the ergogenic effects of tDCS require 
training, a crucial remaining question is what sort of influence tDCS has on the effects 
of such training. In addition to this empirical question, Imperatori et al.’s position raises 
the further question of how we should think about the moral significance of training, 
and its implications for the longer-term effects of tDCS. Their appeal to considerations 
of control in their discussion of inequality offer some clues about why they take training 
to matter morally, echoing Sigmund Loland’s recent analysis of the matter.  
 
 Loland (2018) argues that bans on doping can be justified by appealing to ideals 
of natural human performance and the normative structure of sport. He argues that 
performance enhancement evinced by training is compatible with natural human 
performance, in so far as it involves the systematic utilization of adaptive processes that 
we humans have developed over the course of evolution, and which demarcate the 
boundaries of “physiological authenticity” (Loland, 2018). In contrast, doping 
substances (such as EPO) involve bypassing (rather than merely exploiting) these 
natural adaptive processes; they thus cannot be said to contribute to a performance that 
is authentic in this particular sense.  
 
 On a simplistic analysis (which Loland himself does not endorse), one might say 
that training is significant just because of its compatibility with natural human 
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performance, so construed. Such an approach could spell trouble for the use of tDCS 
in training, if the mechanism via which tDCS provides an ergogenic effect bypasses the 
kinds of adaptive processes that Loland champions. However, notwithstanding the 
difficulties with empirically establishing this, the challenge facing this simplistic 
approach is that it clearly courts the naturalistic fallacy; why should we suppose that ‘the 
natural’ is good in this context? Loland circumvents this problem by offering a deeper 
analysis, according to which the significance of safeguarding the natural in training can 
be grounded by considerations of fairness. He argues that sport is normatively 
structured to reduce as far as possible, inequalities over which the competitor has no 
control. Although inequalities in athletic ability are part and parcel of sport, he suggests 
that these can be fitted within its normative structure, because these differences are 
largely attributable to the athlete’s training and effort, and therefore his control (Loland, 
2018; Loland and McNamee, 2019) . 
  
 Loland’s analysis has clear affinities with some of Imperatori’s remarks about 
the significance of control to considerations of inequality and fairness. Moreover, the 
approach seems to lend support to the permissibility of using tDCS to enhance the 
effect of training on skill acquisition and training, as Imperatori suggest. However, whilst 
it might be plausible to suppose that an appeal to considerations of control can ground 
the normative significance of ‘physiological authenticity’ and training, the empirical 
premises of Loland’s argument here seem highly doubtful – First, it is highly doubtful 
that most inequalities in athletic ability are largely attributable to the athlete’s training 
and effort. We can exert only limited control over many of the key physical attributes 
(such as height) that are central to success in many sports, and it is not clear that these 
inequalities are adequately compensated for by those features that we can control 
(Erler, 2018; Gleaves, 2018).  
 
 Second, there is the still deeper issue of why we should assume that the 
individual is responsible for the results they garner from training, or indeed the degree 
of effort they exert in training. These too may depend on elements that the individual 
herself does not wholly control, such as her native ability to exert effort and will-power 
(Parfit, 1997). Various elements that the individual does not control plausibly 
contribute to these features, including the individual’s genetic make-up, education, and 
social environment. With respect to genetics, Timmons et al. (2010) have shown that 
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RNA profiling and single-gene DNA marker association analysis can be used to yield 
biomarkers with high predictive power about an individual’s VO2max response to 
endurance training. Although this evidence is not conclusive, it is sufficient to at least 
raise doubts about the assumption that the individual is wholly responsible for the 
results they garner from training. 
 
 Accordingly, we believe that there are significant problems with attempting to 
flesh out the normative structure of sport by appeal to considerations of the natural, 
control, responsibility, and fairness. However, there is an alternative virtue-based view 
(developed in most detail by McNamee (2008)) about the normative structure of sport 
that is of use here. Instead of claiming that the effort exerted in training is key to its 
normative significance because it is natural and/or the individual controls  the degree of 
effort they exert, one might instead claim that experiencing the adversity of expending 
effort just is constitutive of a central virtue that certain sports are intended to promote 
and celebrate. The thought here is that the display of certain virtues, and the ability to 
endure particular kinds of costs is plausibly central to the excellences that largely define 
the nature of different sports (Devine, 2011). 
 
 Notably, Savulescu, who adopts a revisionist approach to doping in sports, has 
argued with colleagues that the praiseworthiness of an agent for some endeavour 
(outside of the sporting context) depends on (i) the voluntariness and strength of the 
agent’s committed pursuit of a valuable end (E), (ii) the value of E and (iii) the costliness 
of the committed pursuit of E Maslen, Savulescu and Hunt (2019). They note that the 
expenditure of effort is just one kind of (fungible) cost. Contrary to this analysis though, 
we claim that not all kinds of costs are fungible in the specific context of sport. Consider 
for instance, long-distance cycling; the adversity of the exertion of effort involved in this 
sport (both in and out of competition) is not just one cost that could be exchanged for 
others (such as exposing oneself to a risky procedure that would eliminate the 
experience of pain) in a way that would safeguard the individual’s praiseworthiness for 
the achievement of winning a long-distance race. Rather, if you take away this particular 
kind of cost and the excellence involved in overcoming it, you are no longer talking 
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 What is the upshot of this kind of view for answering the ideal question 
concerning the use of tDCS in training? We can only offer a brief sketch here, but 
contrary to Imperatori at al.’s one size fits all approach to discussing the effects of tDCS 
in sport, this view calls for a nuanced approach to the different effects that tDCS might 





 First, the view we have outlined above places a great deal of importance on the 
different excellences that are central to different sports. Suppose that tDCS were used 
to reduce the adversity of training through diminishing the training athlete’s rate of 
perceived exertion. If so, tDCS would plausibly serve to diminish the extent to which an 
athlete exhibits the particular kind of virtue involved in overcoming such adversity in 
training. However, even assuming that these beneficial training effects would carry over 
to performance in competition, this does not alone entail that it is contrary to the spirit 
of all and every sport. On the view we are appealing to here, sports are organized so 
that “different excellences contribute to the outcome of sporting competition to 
different degrees” (Devine, 2011). In some sports then, such as endurance cycling, 
displays of prolonged and repeated physical exertion in training are plausibly a central 
excellence of the sport; in others, it may be more plausible to suggest that the need for 
such displays of exertion in training is in fact a barrier to the athlete developing skills 
required by other excellences that ought to have greater weight in determining 
outcomes in that sport. We might, for instance, want to place greater emphasis on a 
footballer’s ball skills and creativity than their ability to cope with tests of physical 
endurance in long training sessions, or matches that go into extra time. In a similar vein, 
the virtue involved in spending time engaging in repetitive training exercises to engrain 
 
13
 For a specific discussion of the nature and values inherent in endurance sport, see (Hochstetler and 
Hopsicker, 2012; McNamee, 2008). Notably, there is evidence to suggest that EPO, the paradigm case 
of a doping substance, increases an individual’s rate of perceived exertion whilst it enhances 




 Davis (2013) also supports a sports specific approach to regulating neuro-doping. 
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muscle memory on a very specific motor skill may be a peripheral excellence to some 
sports. Recalling that we are assuming fair universal access to the benefits of tDCS for 
the sake of argument here, our point is that if the enhancement of skill acquisition and 
retention that tDCS might evince enables athletes to spend less time on such exercises, 
and more time developing skills that are required of other excellences in the sport, then 
it may allow athletes to come closer to practicing and performing in accordance with the 
true ideals of the sport in question. 
 
 In reality, this debate about the normative significance of training reflects a 
deeper conflict about the nature and value of sport: Do we want sport to celebrate the 
natural, do we want to create a level playing field that prioritizes the athlete’s control 
over the outcome of competition,
15
 or do we want to celebrate the particular kind of 
excellence and virtues associated with different sports? We cannot hope to definitively 
answer this question here - but the answer we give will have implications for whether we 
should understand the effect that tDCS might have on training to be compatible with 
the deep values that we take the spirit of sport to signify. In any case, contrary to 
Imperatori’s analysis, simply adverting to the fact that the performance-enhancing 
effects of tDCS are only achieved through training does not exhaust the moral question 
of whether its use in training is compatible with the sort of hard work that they take the 
spirit of sport to necessitate. 
 
 Two final concrete casuistic observations are apposite. First, recall that 
Imperatori et al. suggest that tDCS should be treated by WADA in the same way as 
stimulants (i.e. prohibited only in competition). However, it is by no means clear that 
stimulants and tDCS would have comparable effects on training. If tDCS is to be 
treated on the same terms as stimulants on this score, then it is crucial that we obtain 
further data to investigate the long-term effects of tDCS-assisted training on later 
performance, in comparison to the long-term effects of stimulant-assisted training. 
Second, emerging data regarding the effects of tDCS on precision sport performance 
(Kamali et al., 2019) suggests that consistency may demand that WADA apply the same 
sort of sport-specific approach it takes to out-of competition tDCS as it does to Beta-
Blockers. Recall that WADA prohibits the use of beta-blockers for a number of 
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 Alex Erler (2018) convincingly argues that these two aspects are fundamentally in conflict. 
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precision sports. If tDCS and Beta Blockers meaningfully improve performance in 
precision sport by reducing tremors (as the limited data at least suggests), then they 
ought to be included in the same sport-specific categories of the prohibited list for these 
uses.  
 
IV Conclusion – From the Ideal to the Non-Ideal 
 
 Across the whole doping debate there is significant disagreement about how we 
should interpret the WADA criteria for inclusion on the Prohibited List. Yet, even 
across divergent interpretations, there are some broad areas of agreement. Only those 
who adopt highly revisionary approaches to anti-doping would deny that drugs with 
significant ergogenic effects and significant potential of harm should be prohibited. 
Furthermore, there are certain means and methods of improving performance through 
standard forms of training that are not only clearly permissible, but which may partly 
constitute a paradigmatic expression of the spirit of sport. The main area of debate in 
this context pertains to the ‘grey zone’ between these two extremes, where we must 
consider interventions that pose acceptable levels of risk and may have some 
performance-enhancing effect, but an effect that does not rely solely on the athlete’s 
extant physical and mental attributes.  
 
 tDCS lies firmly in this grey zone; however, we have suggested that there are 
grounds for supposing that certain applications of tDCS could plausibly be compatible 
with the spirit of sport, construed on an ‘excellence-based’ understanding. However, 
contrary to Imperatori et al, even assuming the safety of tDCS, we have suggested that 
considering whether (i) tDCS is financially accessible and (ii) whether its enhancing 
effect requires training is not alone sufficient to adequately answer the question of 
whether it is compatible with the spirit of sport. We have suggested that there is a need 
for a more nuanced approach that is sensitive to the different effects that tDCS might 
evince, the mechanisms by which it might do so, and the excellences and virtues that we 
want to emphasise in different sports, both in and out of competition. 
 
 Our discussion in this paper has pertained to the ideal question of whether 
tDCS should be prohibited; we believe that our discussion suggests that there is a clear 
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need to also consider the non-ideal question of whether and how it could be practicable 
for WADA to prohibit certain uses of tDCS. When we turn to the non-ideal question, 
a number of further concrete facts about tDCS become more salient than abstract 
discussions of the spirit of sport. First, it is currently extremely difficult to accurately test 
whether an individual has undergone tDCS (Davis, 2013); this problem might also be 
compounded by legitimate potential future therapeutic uses of neuro-stimulation, 
particularly to treat mild traumatic brain injuries and concussion that may result from 
participation in certain sports (de Amorim et al., 2017; Clayton et al., 2016; 
Ghaffarpasand et al., 2014; Li et al., 2015) .  
 
 Yet, difficulty of detection alone is arguably not sufficient to justify refraining 
from prohibition; for instance, the use of xenon and argon is also banned by WADA, 
despite concerns about the absence of a valid test for these substances (McGrath, 2014). 
There can perhaps be some value in prohibiting methods and substances that one 
cannot detect in order to communicate social condemnation of those practices. 
However, in the case of tDCS, we also know relatively little about its safety and efficacy 
profile; but we do know that poorly designed dysfunctional versions of the technology 
pose a greater safety risk, and it is possible for individuals to build their own devices.  
 
 In our view, these considerations cumulatively speak in favour of listing tDCS as 
a method that should not be prohibited by WADA, given the nature of our non-ideal 
circumstances. Contrary to Imperatori et al.’s analysis, the relevant comparator for the 
regulation of tDCS in the non-ideal context should not be stimulants per se; rather it is 
caffeine. As discussed above, caffeine was taken off the prohibited list in light of non-
ideal considerations, and we suggest that WADA should adopt a similar approach to 
tDCS as it currently does to caffeine. Even if we assume there are strong ideal grounds 
for prohibiting tDCS in competition, it is difficult to see how such a ban could be 
enforced, and prohibition could encourage use the use of unsafe devices or stimulation 
parameters. As such, we suggest that WADA should monitor the use of tDCS in the 
same way that caffeine is currently monitored. As part of that monitoring, WADA 
should work with companies developing tDCS devices to ensure that athletes are 
properly informed about the effects and risks of tDCS. Athletes should be encouraged 
to report their use of tDCS, and to participate in controlled studies, so that we might 
better understand the nature of tDCS’ effects in this specific cohort, and to attain the 
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quality evidence that is missing in pharmacological doping. Such studies are central to 
ensuring that athletes now and in the future remain properly informed about the 
risk/benefit profile of tDCS, and to fully understanding whether it, and future forms of 
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